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Introduction
Many economists believe that market prices do a good job of allocating resources. In particular, the stock market is seen as playing an important role in efficiently allocating capital to its most productive uses. The stock market price of a firm represents the expected present value of future dividends --the "fundamental" price. Increases in the stock market price provide incentives for managers to issue equity and attract capital to their firms.
This standard view of the stock market was called into question by events in the late 1990s. Scores of commentators --including many economists -claim that there was stock market overvaluation in the late 1990s. Moreover, there is a widespread belief that stock market overvaluation --or a bubble --led to overinvestment, especially in ".com" companies and Internet-related firms, such as those in telecommunications. 1 A bubble might affect investment if investors become unduly excited about particular firms and, in their excitement, they bid up the prices of these firms (Shiller, 2000 (Shiller, , 2001 Shleifer, 2000) . Overvalued shares lower the perceived cost of equity capital. If managers act on this lower perceived cost, they would issue new shares, lower the discount rate used in evaluating investment projects, and increase investment spending. 2 The central core of the standard story of capital allocation involves rates of return and discount rates. Favorable shocks --an increase in demand or a technical improvement -raise returns to capital for the fortunate firm (Cochrane, 2001; Fama, 1976) . A firm earning high returns (relative to its cost of capital or discount rate) increases its capital stock until the return on the marginal unit of capital again equals the discount rate. Absent externalities, capital is being allocated optimally.
The central core of the overinvestment story also involves rates of return and discount rates. A bubble lowers the discount rate, leading to higher investment. If managers use a discount rate below the market rate, they would invest too much, the rate of return on their investment would be too low, and capital would be misallocated. This paper focuses on the central core of these two stories by examining the discount rates used by firms in making their investment decisions. One possible way to measure discount rates would be to survey managers. This approach has many advantages but, for our purposes, it has two key disadvantages. First, we cannot reach back in time to find out the discount rate used by managers at a time when their firm might have been overvalued. Second, there are potential issues of selection bias due to differential response rates across firms with different characteristics. Instead, we use a revealed preference approach that relies on the investment decisions of firms --combined with investment theory --to estimate the discount rates actually used by managers of U.S. firms.
To assess the potential role of bubbles, we focus on a class of firms -high-price firms -that financial economists have identified as possibly overvalued. The high-price portfolio comprises firms with high stock market prices relative to a simple accounting measure of fundamentals. This class of firms is frequently referred to as "growth" firms. Such a label would be inconsistent with the perspective taken in this paper. Firms facing fundamental shocks and whose behavior is described by the standard story could be considered growth firms.
However, this label is inappropriate for those firms whose high stock price is due to bubbles and whose behavior is described by the overinvestment story.
The standard story in economics holds that firms may enter the high-price portfolio as a result of favorable shocks that provide the firms with good investment opportunities and thus increase their stock market price. The overinvestment story claims that the high stock price of high-price firms is based on investor sentiment, not good investment opportunities. We therefore divide the firms in the high-price portfolio into those with good or poor investment opportunities.
If the standard story applies to all high-price firms, firms with both good and poor investment opportunities should have discount rates equal to the market rate (suitably adjusted for risk). 3 If the misallocation story applies to all high-price firms, both sub-classes of firms should have discount rates that are lower than the market rate. Our econometric work suggests something in between. The estimated discount rate is above the market rate for firms with good investment opportunities. For firms with poor investment opportunities, the discount rate is below the market rate. The difference in discount rates (relative to risk-adjusted market rates) is economically and statistically significant. Thus the standard story describes high-price firms with good investment opportunities and the misallocation story high-price firms with poor investment opportunities.
We then undertake three robustness checks. First, the benchmark results are based on using demand shocks as a measure of investment opportunities. We examine cost shocks as an alternative way to identify recent news about investment opportunities. Firms with favorable cost shocks should have relatively good investment opportunities. Using cost shocks as a measure of investment opportunities, we confirm the benchmark results -the estimated discount rate for high-price firms with poor investment opportunities is below the market rate. It is significantly lower than the discount rate used by high-price firms with good investment opportunities. Second, insofar as investment opportunities may be difficult to measure, we also examine the discount rate wedge for high-price firms whose shareholders have long horizons.
We would not expect firms described by these two characteristics to have a discount rate wedge that differs systematically from zero. This prediction is borne-out by the empirical results. Third, we take a different but complementary approach that evaluates a series of restricted econometric models in terms of J tests. These misspecified models are useful in evaluating the standard and overinvestment stories, and the test results are consistent with the above findings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the Euler equation from a formal optimization problem that is the basis for the econometric analysis. Section 3 discusses the panel dataset (details are provided in the Appendix) and the summary statistics that describe various subsets of firms. Section 4 presents our benchmark results with this Euler equation and uncovers strong evidence for the empirical relevance of both the standard and overinvestment stories for appropriate subsets of firms. Section 5 contains several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 3 The discount rate will be above the market rate if finance constraints prevent firms from equating the discount rate to the market rate on a period-by-period basis.
Model
Our estimation strategy exploits the intertemporal pattern of investment spending to "reveal" the discount rate guiding investment decisions. The Euler investment equation has been a workhorse model in the investment literature and has been used by, among others, Shapiro (1986) , Whited (1992) , Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) , and Schaller (2001, 2004) to study investment spending. Being a first-order condition for profit-maximization, the Euler equation is closely-tied to optimal firm behavior. Moreover, investment and discount rate variables enter explicitly (unlike, for example, the equally popular Brainard-Tobin Q equation), and thus it is straightforward to introduce a parameter representing the discount rate wedge.
The Euler equation that is the basis for our estimates can be obtained through informal and formal derivations. 4 The informal derivation begins with the net present value relation that links the stream of future benefits from an incremental capital project to its cost,
where R is the real discount factor equal to 1 (1 ) r δ − + + in the absence of bubbles (where r is the real risk-adjusted discount rate and δ is the economic rate of depreciation), 
The companion net present value relation to equation (1) for period t+1 is written as follows,
where both sides of the equation have been multiplied by an extra R. Equation (3) can be rewritten as follows,
(4)
The difficulty with using any of these equations in estimation is that they contain an infinite number of future variables. This problem is overcome by a suitable transformation (akin to a Koyck transformation in distributed lag models). In this case, we subtract equation (4) from (2) and thus obtain the following Euler equation,
The Euler equation in (5) can also be obtained as a first-order condition in a formal optimization problem. We assume that the firm chooses labor and capital inputs to maximize its market value. The firm is constrained by three technologies. The production technology
to the labor ( t L ) and capital ( t K ) inputs and to a stochastic technology shock. The adjustment cost technology ( [ , ] t t G I K , where t I is investment) affects the acquisition of capital (though not labor). Adjustment costs are valued by the price of foregone output, are affected by a stochastic shock, and are convex in investment. The latter is a critical assumption, as it forces the firm to consider its future plans when making current decisions. The accumulation technology determines the existing capital stock as a weighted sum of past investments, where the weights follow a declining exponential or geometric pattern.
Moreover, the firm is a price-taker in its input market, though not necessarily in its output market. With the value maximization objective and these four constraints, optimal behavior for a forward-looking firm is determined by variational, optimal control, or dynamic programming methods.
In order to implement the Euler equation, we need to specify the MIC, MPK, and R variables. The MIC is specified as follows,
where t MAC is a second-order Taylor approximation to the adjustment cost function, [ , ]
The MPK is determined by an application of Euler's Theorem of Homogeneous
Functions to the following relation between output and the production and adjustment cost technologies,
to yield the following expression for the MPK,
where SALES is net nominal sales, COST is the nominal cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses, and ζ is a parameter capturing the combined effects of imperfect competition and non-constant returns to scale in production. When the firm is a price-taker in its output market and [ , ] t t F L K exhibits constant returns to scale, ζ equals 1. Deviations from these characteristics results in deviations of ζ from unity.
The discount factor, R, is generalized in two ways from the specification reported for equation (1). We recognize the possibility that our specification of the discount rate, r, may not be complete and may include a parameter, Θ , common to all firms. Of most importance to this study is the discount rate wedge, μ , that enters the specification only for subsets of firms and is multiplied by an indicator variable, Ω . This indicator variable varies by firm and over time and takes a value of 1 when firm i enters either the high-price PIO or high-price GIO portfolios, and leads to the following specification of the discount factor, 1 , ,
where the firm (i), time (t), and sector (s) subscripts are explicit and i(s) indicates that the variable is available at the sector level for firm i.
The Euler equation is estimated by GMM with instruments that are lags of the variables appearing in the Euler equation,
where 1 t τ − is the corporate income tax rate, 1 t u − is the investment tax credit rate, and 1 t z − is the present value of depreciation allowances.
Dataset
We examine U.S. firms for two reasons. First, the United States has the most richly developed capital markets in the world and is therefore less likely to suffer from overvaluation and overinvestment. Second, the maximum amount of firm-level data is available for the United
States. This latter factor is important to obtain a sufficient number of firms in the high-price portfolio, which contains only the top two deciles in a given year. This portfolio is further reduced by sorting by investment opportunities. Most of the empirical work is based on more than 50,000 firm-year observations. The panel data consists of a representative sample of U.S.
publicly traded firms for the period 1980-2004. In fact, the sample approaches the universe of U.S. publicly traded firms. The primary data source is CompuStat with additional information obtained from CRSP and various sources of industry and aggregate data. Details about the dataset are contained in the Appendix.
We maximize the size of the dataset used in estimation in three ways. First, we use an unbalanced panel, and thus avoid the severe data restrictions imposed by a balanced panel. This choice has the further advantage of attenuating survivorship bias. Second, even in an unbalanced panel, some methods of constructing the replacement value of the capital stock require long strings of contiguous data to implement the perpetual inventory formula. We partly avoid this problem by tailoring our algorithm to preserve observations when there are gaps in the data and to use data that are more frequently available in CompuStat (e.g., when we find evidence of substantial acquisitions and divestitures, we use data on property, plant, and equipment in addition to the capital expenditure data). An additional problem posed by the perpetual inventory formula is its dependence on an initial or seed value of the capital stock drawn from financial statements. This initial value can be a particularly poor measure of capital's replacement cost that distorts the computed capital stock (K) until the impact of the initial value is largely depreciated. One solution to this problem is to compute the capital stock for many years before using these data in estimation, but this approach discards a substantial number of observations. As an alternative, we adopt the procedure discussed in detail in Chirinko and Schaller (2005) that computes an adjustment factor for the initial value taken from financial statements. Third, the Euler equation and the instruments we have chosen require only three years of contiguous data. All of the estimates reported below are based on sample sizes that exceed 50,000 firm-year observations.
The real risk-adjusted market discount rate (r t ) is constructed in several steps. We begin with a weighted-average of the nominal returns to debt and equity, where the weights vary by sector. The nominal return to debt is adjusted for the tax deductibility of interest payments. The nominal return to equity is based on the CAPM, and thus accounts for systematic risk. The nominal weighted-average is converted to a real return with an inflation adjustment that varies across sectors and over time.
The other variables used in this study are constructed as follows. The depreciation rate is taken from the BEA, and is allowed to vary across industries and over time. The relative price of investment is the ratio of the price of investment to the price of output. These industry-specific, implicit price deflators are taken from the BEA; the relative price series is adjusted for corporate income taxes. New share issues (NSI) are measured as the ratio of the proceeds from equity issues relative to nominal investment spending. The marginal product of capital (MPK) is computed as described in equation (9).
We determine whether a firm is in the high-price portfolio in a given year using the Sales/Price ratio, the ratio of net nominal sales to the nominal value of common equity. The Sales/Price ratio has several key advantages: sales is a relatively straightforward accounting concept, rarely extremely small, and never negative. 5 Portfolios are formed by sorting all the firms for which the necessary data is available in a given year by the Sales/Price ratio. The two deciles with the lowest Sales/Price ratio -equivalently, the highest stock price (relative to sales) --in a given year are classified as high-price firms. The portfolio formation procedure allows a firm to be a high-price firm this year but not in a subsequent year. In fact, it is common for firms to move in and out of the high-price portfolio.
Firms that enter the high-price portfolio are further classified by investment opportunities (IO), which are measured by real sales growth over the prior three years. Firms with poor investment opportunities (PIO) or good investment opportunities (GIO) are those firms with sales growth in the bottom and top quartiles of high-price firms, respectively. Thus, in a given
year, firms that are in the high-price, poor investment opportunity portfolio represent approximately 5% of the firms with serviceable data for that year.
When analyzing investment, we use the capital stock to control for size, which is frequently measured by the equity value of the firm (especially in finance research). In the current study concerned with stock market bubbles, this approach would be clearly inappropriate.
Instead, we use the capital stock calculated using a standard perpetual inventory algorithm. The primary variable we analyze is the ratio of investment to the capital stock (I/K). There are a few extreme outliers for I/K. This is a common issue in panel data studies involving I/K. We address this issue by deleting the 1% tails of the I/K distribution.
Summary statistics are presented in three separate panels in 
Benchmark Empirical Results
This section presents estimates of the discount rate wedge based on the Euler equation (5) and the investment behavior of high-price firms at the time of portfolio formation. To attempt to differentiate between the standard and overinvestment stories, the high-price portfolio is divided by the investment opportunities available to firms. If the standard story applies to all firms in the high-price portfolio, firms with either PIO or GIO should use discount rates that do not differ systematically from their risk-adjusted market rates. However, if the overinvestment story is relevant for a subset of firms in the high-price portfolio, their actual discount rate should be below their risk-adjusted market rate. This situation is most likely to occur for high-price PIO firms. Thus, the discount rate wedge, represented by μ and defined as the difference between the actual discount rate used by the firm and its risk-adjusted market rate, will allow us to discriminate between the standard and overinvestment stories.
We use the Euler equation to estimate the discount rate wedge for the high-price firms with poor ( PIO μ ) and good ( GIO μ ) investment opportunities, respectively. In the first column of (1) and (2) and the hypothesis that LH μ 0 = in column (3); p-values are in brackets. The ζ parameter captures deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition; a value of ζ less than unity is consistent with either decreasing returns to scale regardless of the degree of competition in the output market or increasing returns to scale and a sufficient degree of imperfect competition to force the marginal return to capital below its average return. In either case, the firm is earning positive economic rents. The α parameters are from the marginal adjustment cost function defined in equation (7). The cost statistics depend on the estimated α parameters and are evaluated at the median values t I and t K . The J statistic is the Hansen-Sargan statistic for overidentification; p-values are in brackets. N is the number of firm/year observations. The instruments are discussed in Section 2. Details concerning the definitions, construction, and sources of the data are discussed in Section 3 and the Appendix. Standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Three additional results presented in column (1) are worth noting. First, the ζ parameter, which captures deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition, is less than one.
While the difference from unity is statistically significant, it would not appear to be economically important. Second, marginal adjustment costs are positive and increasing, and thus the adjustment cost function is convex. This property is required by the optimization problem presented in Section 2 that underlies the Euler equation. Third, the Hansen-Sargan J test evaluating the overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the model, thus providing some assurance of the reasonableness of our empirical specification.
The point estimate of PIO 0.195 μ =− indicates a substantial misallocation of capital. In order to draw the implications of bubbles for capital formation, we need to assess the impact of PIO μ on the incentive to accumulate capital and then the impact of this enhanced incentive on capital accumulation. Recall that our estimates of PIO μ and GIO μ apply to the lowest and highest quartile of high-price firms, respectively, sorted by investment opportunities. We assume that this wedge would decline evenly between these two extremes, and hence the average value for the change in the discount rate wedge for all high-price firms is 0.100 Δμ = − .
Lowering the discount rate by -0.100 leads to a 37.7% decline in the user cost of capital (see the Appendix for the computations). The impact of these enhanced incentives on capital formation depends on the degree to which capital substitutes for other factors in the production function.
Estimates of this elasticity of substitution have varied widely from 0.40 (Chirinko, Fazzari, and Mayer, forthcoming) to 1.00 (the value implied by a Cobb-Douglas production function) to 1.20 (Schaller, 2006) . Given this range of elasticities, high-price firms accumulate between 15.1% and 45.2% too much capital. While high-price firms comprise 20% of the sample, their mean capital stock is approximately half as large as that for the mean firm (see Table 1 .B.). Taken together, these figures roughly imply a reduction of 1.5% to 4.5% of the capital stock for publicly traded firms. It takes a substantial period of time for these excesses to be reversed by the depreciation of capital (though the adjustment process could be accelerated by a reduction in planned investment spending). Five years after a bubble, nearly one-half of the misallocated capital would remain. The effects of bubbles on misallocating capital are substantial and may be long-lasting.
Robustness Checks
This section presents a series of robustness checks on the Euler equation and the core result that both the standard and overinvestment stories are empirically relevant.
Cost Shocks
The results discussed so far have been based on demand shocks as a measure of investment opportunities. In this sub-section, we turn instead to cost shocks. Specifically, we use low (or perhaps negative) recent growth in the Cost/Sales ratio to identify firms with good investment opportunities. Favorable cost shock observations are defined as those with a change in the ratio of nominal costs to nominal sales over the previous three years in the bottom quartile.
The results based on cost shocks are presented the column (2) of Table 2 , and the results strongly parallel those with demand shocks. In particular, PIO μ is negative and statistically and economically significant, and GIO μ is not statistically far from zero. The difference between these two discount rate wedges is somewhat smaller than in column 1; nonetheless, the Wald statistic confirms that this difference is statistically significant. Stein (1996) develops a theoretical model in which a bubble induces a firm to use a discount rate lower than the risk-adjusted rate if the manager has short horizons or the financing constraint is binding. In the former case, a bubble presents short-horizon managers with an opportunity in the form of cheap equity without the attending costs when a bubble becomes widely known. In the latter case, a bubble presents financially-constrained managers with an opportunity to relax a binding constraint. According to the Stein model, the discount rates of firms with long horizons and without a financing constraint at the time of portfolio formation will be unaffected by a bubble.
Long Horizons
To test this latter prediction, we need to identify a class of firms that is financially unconstrained and whose managers have short horizons. High-price firms are unlikely to have binding finance constraints. We identify firms with short horizons on the basis of their share turnover. The intuition is simple. Investors care about the performance of the firm until when they sell their shares. When turnover is high --and the expected duration of share ownership is therefore low --the median shareholder will tend to care less about the firm's performance in the more distant future. As a result, managers may behave as if they have a short horizon. Horizons are measured by share turnover, defined as the mean (over the year) of the daily ratio of the volume of shares traded to shares outstanding at the end of the day. Firms with long horizons are those with share turnover in the prior year above the median for all observations in the prior year.
Euler equation estimates of the discount rate wedge for firms with high-prices and low share turnover are presented in column (3) of Table 2 . The model delivers sensible results for the adjustment cost function and the J statistic. More importantly, these results document that the prediction of the Stein model is consistent with the data. The estimated discount rate wedge for high-price firms with long horizons is small and statistically insignificant.
Restricted Models
The results presented in Table 2 have defined discount rate wedges in order to evaluate hypotheses suggested by the theory. This sub-section takes a different but complementary approach and estimates a series of restricted models. These misspecified models are useful in assessing the standard and overinvestment stories and are evaluated by the J statistic. Specification issues arise, however, when PIO μ is constrained to zero in column (2). In this case, the J statistic rises sharply and has a p-value of 0.020 that indicates model misspecification.
Given these results, it is not surprising that when both discount rate wedges are constrained to zero, the J statistic indicates that the model remains misspecified.
These results are confirmed in columns (4) through (6) when investment opportunities are measured by cost shocks. The only difference is that when PIO μ is constrained to zero in column (5), the p-value of 0.105 is slightly above the conventional cutoff of 0.100.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 confirm the findings that both the standard and overinvestment stories describe subsets of high-price firms.
Conclusions
This paper considers the possibility that the stock market occasionally overvalues firm and these bubbles lead to overinvestment. If stock prices rise above fundamental values (a possibility suggested by much recent academic literature), firms would have access to a relatively cheap source of finance that results in an increase in investment. For these overvalued In the standard case, KCHG is gross investment (I), which is capital expenditures in the firm's financial statements (CompuStat item 128). CompuStat does not always have reliable data for the additions to the capital stock associated with large acquisitions. We use a modified version of the algorithm of Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) to adjust KCHG for acquisitions and divestitures. In the case of a substantial acquisition, we can use accounting identities to derive a more accurate measure of the additions to the capital stock:
where DGPLANT is the change in GPLANT from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t and GPLANT is gross property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 7), ACQUIS is acquisitions, and RETIRE is retirements of capital stock (CompuStat item 184). (When data on RETIRE is missing, we assume that the reason is that firms do not report any retirements in their financial statements, and we therefore assign a value of 0 to RETIRE for these observations.) We use the following screen to identify cases where there has been a substantial acquisition. If , , 
where DNPLANT is the change in NPLANT (as defined above). (To see this result, start with the perpetual inventory equation, , , ) Because NPLANT in the firm's financial statements will deduct depreciation (as well as accounting for the divestiture), depreciation must be added to KCHG to avoid deducting depreciation twice.
If GPLANT is missing (or equal to zero) or DGPLANT is missing, it is not feasible to use these screens, and we set KCHG equal to I.
In some cases, there is a data gap for a particular firm. In this case, we treat the first new observation for that firm in the same way as we would if it were the initial observation. This avoids any potential sample selection bias that would result from dropping firms with gaps in their data.
We construct sector-specific, time-varying depreciation rates using data from the BEA. Specifically, ,1996 , , , 
where D$ is current-cost depreciation of private fixed assets by sector (BEA , Table 3 .4ES), DQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of depreciation of private fixed assets by sector (BEA , Table 3 .5ES), K$ is the current cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (as defined above), and KQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of the net stock of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3 .2ES).
We construct the sector-specific price index for investment using BEA data: 
where I$ is historical-cost investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA , Table 3 .7ES) and IQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3 .8ES).
A.3. Tax-Adjusted Relative Price of Investment Goods
We define the tax-adjusted relative price of investment goods as follows, Under the CAPM, 
A.5. Bubbles and Overinvestment
This section provides the details underlying the calculations reported in Section IV.
Three steps are required to translate the discount rate wedge of PIO 0.195 μ =− into the amount of misallocated capital for high-price firms.
First, we translate the estimate of the discount rate wedgesthat apply to the lowest and highest quartile (measured by investment opportunities) of high-price firms to all high-price firms. We know that the discount rate wedges are PIO 0.195 μ =− and GIO 0.004 μ =− for the lowest and highest quartile of high-price firms, respectively. We assume that this wedge declines evenly between these two extremes, and hence the discount rate wedges for all four quartiles are -0.195, -0.131, -0.068, and -0.004. (This procedure is numerically equivalent to averaging the estimates of PIO μ and GIO μ .) The average value for the change in the discount rate wedge for all high-price firms is 0.100 Δμ = − .
Second, the user cost of capital can be represented as follows, UC (r ) * RP *TAX = +μ+δ ,
where r is the real, risk-adjusted discount rate discussed above, μ is the discount rate wedge, δ is the economic rate of capital depreciation, RP is the relative price of investment goods, and TAX represents a collection of tax variables (income tax and investment credit rates; value of tax depreciation). The percentage change in the user cost evaluated at 0 μ = is computed as follows, % UC / (r ) Δ =Δμ +δ .
Based on the dataset, the mean value of r is 0.120 and δ is 0.145. Based on these figures, the percentage change in the user cost equals, %ΔUC Δμ / (r δ) 0.100 / (0.120 0.145) 0.377 = + =− + =− . 27 Third, per the discussion in Section 4, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between capital and other factors ( σ ) is between 0.40 and 1.20. Thus, the lower and upper bounds of the percentage change in the capital stock is computed according to this formula, %ΔK σ *(%ΔUC) {0.151, 0.452} = − = .
(A16)
